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ABSTRACT 
The Australian cotton industry confronts a range of serious occupational health and 
environmental challenges, many of which relate to the use and misuse of agricultural 
chemicals. This article asks which policy instruments are likely to be most effective and 
efficient in addressing those challenges? Is government regulation a credible option or 
would industry self-regulation achieve better results? Is there a role for safety. Health and 
environmental management systems or is some other option, or combination of options, 
likely to achieve better economic and health and environmental outcomes? More broadly, 
given the substantial threats to the cotton industry's legitimacy (and indirectly to its 
economic viability) resulting from its tarnished environmental image, how might the 
industry best preserve its 'social license' and rebuild trust and credibility with key 
stakeholders? The answers to these questions will have broader resonance than to the 
cotton industry alone. The industry provides a classic example of the health and 
environmental challenges that confront high input, intensively irrigated agriculture and 
other industries that have aroused a high degree of public concern concerning their health 
and environmental impact. The ways it has reacted to the pressures it faced and sought 
through voluntary environmental management arrangements (VEMAs), to protect both its 
'social license' and its economic viability, contain important lessons for many other 
industry sectors that will, sooner or later, confront similar health, environmental and 
economic challenges. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
 
In a little over three decades, Australian cotton farming had developed into a $1.5 billion 
dollar industry and the third largest exporter of cotton in the world.  But that growth has 
come at a substantial cost to the environment and to workers’ health. Of greatest concern 
have been the risks associated with agricultural chemicals. In the late 1990s the use of 
endosulfan in particular, posed a serious threat not only to the environment, but also to 
the adjoining cattle industry, whose export markets were threatened by high pesticide 
residues found in export beef. Cotton related pesticides have also been connected with 
fish kills and other damage to aquatic life, raised occupational health concerns amongst 
agricultural workers, and community concerns regarding pesticide residues found in 
domestic water tanks and elsewhere. 
 
Against this backdrop, we must consider which policy instruments are likely to be most 
effective and efficient in addressing the occupational health and environmental 
challenges the industry faces? Is government regulation a credible option or would 
industry self-regulation achieve better results? Is there a role for environmental 
management systems (EMS) or is some other option, or combination of options, likely to 
achieve better economic health and environmental outcomes? More broadly, given the 
substantial threats to the cotton industry’s legitimacy (and indirectly to its economic 
                                                 
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Patricia Healy and Allan Williams and the 
contribution of the various interviewees who must remain anonymous. 
  
 4 
viability) resulting from its tarnished environmental image, how might the industry best 
preserve its ‘social licence’ (i.e. the expectations of local communities, the wider society, 
and various constituent groups) and rebuild trust and credibility with key stakeholders?2 
 
The answers to these questions will have broader resonance than to the cotton industry 
alone. The industry provides a classic example of the health and environmental 
challenges that confront high input, intensively irrigated agriculture and other industries 
that have aroused a high degree of public concern concerning their environmental impact. 
The ways it has reacted to the pressures it faced and sought through voluntary 
environmental management arrangements (VEMAs), to protect both its ‘social license’ 
and its economic viability, contain important lessons for many other industry sectors 
which will, sooner or later, confront similar health, environmental and economic 
challenges. As we will see, the cotton industry responded to these threats by producing 
what it terms an “industry –wide ems”3 and by developing a variety of industry level self-
regulatory initiatives through its Best Management Practices (BMP) program. In effect, 
the industry association sought to develop an industry-wide VEMA, with heavy reliance 
on codes of practice, BMPs and (in a broad sense) EMS. 
 
This article draws on interviews with a diversity of stakeholders,4 the evolving literature 
on the cotton industry (including the 2003 external audit of the industry5) and the wider 
international experience of self-regulatory initiatives. Its focus is the occupational health 
and environmental impact of agricultural chemicals, and the lessons that can be learned 
from the cotton industry experience in terms of designing better policy mixes, and 
integrating voluntary environmental management arrangements with government and 
third party oversight. It does not examine, nor take any position on, the cotton industry’s 
use of scarce water resources, or the broader issue of whether the cotton industry can 
even be made sustainable in Australian conditions, given its levels of resource 
consumption and chemical use.  
 
A. Cotton, Health and Environment 
The modern Australian cotton industry was established with the introduction of irrigated 
cotton production during the 1960s.6 Today, 70% of cotton production is in central and 
north-western NSW, stretching south from the Macintyre River through to the Gwydir, 
Namoi and Macquarie and Lachlan valleys, as well as along the Barwon and Darling 
Rivers. Australia’s remaining cotton production occurs in central and southern 
Queensland – in the Darling Downs, St George, Dirranbandi and Macintyre Valley in the 
                                                 
2 We define social license as the demands and expectations vis-à-vis a business enterprise that emerge 
from  neighborhoods, environmental groups, community members, and other elements of the surrounding 
civil society. 
3 See William (et al), 2004. 
4  A total of 22 open-ended interviews were conducted with cotton industry association representatives, 
cotton growers, environmental groups, government agencies, farmers’ federations and other significant 
stakeholders.  
5 Cotton Research and Development Corporation (August 2003) Second Australian Cotton Industry 
Environmental Audit http://www.crdc.com.au/ accessed 28 August 2003. 
6 Gibb Environmental Sciences & Arbour International (Gibb) (1991) An Environmental Audit of the 
Australian Cotton Industry: Executive Summary, Gibb Environmental Sciences & Arbour International. 
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south and Emerald, Theodore and Biloela in the central region. Overall, Australian cotton 
production covers an area of over 400,000 hectares, with production of just over 3 million 
bales each year7.  
 
Many cotton farms are owned and independently operated by family farmers, who also 
practice other forms of agriculture, including sheep and cattle grazing. However, there 
are also an increasing number of large corporate farms. The latter have large amounts of 
capital available, and are progressive in their utilisation of technology and advanced 
farming practices. 
 
Cotton production requires intensive management including irrigation, weed control, and 
insect control.8 Insect management is particularly important, as cotton is susceptible to a 
wide range of insect pests throughout its 180-200 day growing period, and poor 
management may cause significant economic damage. Substantial quantities of pesticides 
including herbicides, insecticides and defoliants are used to manage the impacts of 
insects on cotton crops (conventional cotton is sprayed 6-12 times). Defoliation is also 
necessary as a precursor to harvesting and conditioners are also applied before harvest, to 
speed and even up boll opening and reduce ‘trash’ in the cotton fibre. Seed that is to be 
reused for planting is treated with fungicide and systemic insecticide. According to one 
environmental group, “conventionally grown cotton uses more insecticides than any other 
single crop and epitomizes the worst effects of chemically dependent agriculture. Each 
year cotton producers around the world use nearly [US]$2.6 billion worth of pesticides – 
more than 10% of the world’s pesticides and nearly 25% of the world’s insecticides.”9  
 
Within Australia, agricultural cotton industry chemical use has been identified as causing 
off-site environmental damage to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, as well as to 
surrounding communities, and agricultural properties. Not only do some of the individual 
chemicals used cause environmental, occupational health and safety impacts, but there is 
a potential for cumulative impact to arise from a combination of chemicals applied. Of 
particular concern is the use of the organochlorine (endosulfan), which is used for the 
control of heliothis and may also be use to control rough bollworms, mirids , thrips, 
aphids and tipworm.10 Endosulfan has a high acute or immediate toxicity to humans and 
can reach concentrations in waterways that are lethal to various forms of aquatic life. The 
use of endosulfan in cotton production came into particularly sharp focus in 1999 when 
cattle graziers found endosulfan residue accumulation in their cattle. The residues not 
only lowered their sale price but threatening international beef exports: most dramatically 
when a shipment of Australian beef was rejected by South Korea because it contained 
                                                 
7 Cotton Australia, 2003. Yields for the last two seasons have been substantially below average. 
8 Gibb Environmental Sciences & Arbour International (Gibb) (1991) An Environmental Audit of the 
Australian Cotton Industry: Executive Summary, Gibb Environmental Sciences & Arbour International. 
9 Pesticide Action Network North America (2003) Problems with Conventional Cotton Production 
http://www.panna.org/resources/documents/conventionalCotton.dv.html accessed on 25 April 2003. 
10Barrett, JWH., Peterson, SM., & Batley, GE, (1991) Impact of Pesticides on the riverine environment 
with specific reference to cotton growing Report to the Cotton Research and Development Corporation and 
the Land and Water Resources Research and Development Corporation, Narrabri.  
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unacceptable residue levels.11 Property prices of cattle farms close to cotton areas were 
also perceived to be threatened. 
 
Many insecticides are also toxic to aquatic organisms, bees and birds. If applied 
carelessly, they can enter the local waterway killing a variety of species and damaging 
ecosystems.12 A major monitoring program conducted by the NSW Department of Land 
and Water Conservation from the mid 1990s onward revealed the presence of several 
pesticides in rivers near and downstream of cotton growing areas during the growing 
season. The program found endosulfan at amounts significantly in excess of 
environmental guidelines for the protection of ecosystems13. Spray drift, and runoff are 
significant pathways.14 Chemical contamination has led to a range of impacts including 
fish kills and changes in species composition downstream from cotton areas. For 
example, thousands of dead fish were found in the Boomi River in north-west New South 
Wales which was later linked to endosulfan water contamination.15 
 
The Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) impacts of agricultural chemicals in the 
cotton industry are less well documented. In one study, cotton ranked third among 
Californian crops for total number of worker illnesses caused by pesticides.16 
Unfortunately, no comparable and reliable Australian figures are available. However, a 
1991 report on the Australian cotton industry concluded that “occupational exposure to 
pesticides is a more significant health problem and there is evidence that this is not taken 
sufficiently seriously. The use of proper protective clothing and equipment is of 
paramount importance as well as a general vigilance against poor practice.”17 Anecdotal 
evidence derived from interviews suggest that at least until recently, OHS had indeed 
been an important, if underestimated, problem. For example, respondents described the 
common past practices as including: workers marking for pesticide spraying aircraft with 
flags (exposing them directly to pesticides), failing to wear protective clothing, chippers 
being sent back into the fields too soon after they had been sprayed, and mixing 
chemicals without wearing a mask. 
 
Finally, there has been some concern about the impact of cotton industry pesticides on 
local communities adjacent to cotton growing areas.18 A 2000 report by the NSW 
Environment Protection Authority and New England Health confirmed that endosulfan 
                                                 
11 Australian Associated Press (AAP) (1999) Cotton Industry Calls for Endosulfan Compo Claims, 15 
January 1999, Canberra. 
12 See “Clearing the Air: Pesticide Spray Drift” Total Environment Centre, Sydney, 2000.  
13 Muschal, M. (1997) Central and north west regions water quality program: 1996/97 report on pesticides 
monitoring CBR 97.063. NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation, Paramatta, Australia. 
14 Raupach, MR., Briggs, PR., Ford, PW., Leys JF. (et al) (2001) Endosulfan transport: I. Integrative 
assessment of airborne and waterborne Journal of Environmental Quality, Madison, May/June. 
15 “Cotton chemical linked to dead fish” Sydney Morning Herald, 21 January 1998. 
16 Pesticide Action Network North America, 2003 and references therein. 
17 Gibb, 1991 op cit p 130.  See also Franklin, RC., Fragar, LJ., Houlahan, J., Brown, P., & Burcham, J. 
(2001) Health and Safety Risks Associated with Cotton Production On-Farm Australian Centre for 
Agricultural Health and Safety, and Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation, Moree. 
18 See “Gunnedah: A community in crisis over pesticides” Total Environment Centre, Sydney, 1997.  
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spray drift was detectable in the water that communities drink, cook and bath in.19 
Although no damaging health impact was established further monitoring was regarded as 
desirable.20 However, some members of local communities strongly believe that there has 
been a high incidence of certain diseases, and that these are directly connected to spray 
drift from the industry. They also complain that there has been insufficient monitoring 
and that test results themselves may be suspect. 
 
By the late 1990s the cotton industry was confronting an environmental crisis. 
Endosulfan had been detected in cattle (and traced back to its origins in spray drift from 
cotton farms), putting the beef export trade under threat. Fish kills downstream from 
cotton areas, connected to pesticides used in cotton production, had also been well 
documented. Communities were concerned about levels of pesticides from spray drift, 
especially in tank water and complained about the rank odour attributed to chemicals 
used in cotton production. Pesticides used in cotton production were also suspected of 
causing a high incidence of certain diseases among communities in cotton growing areas, 
and of threatening workers’ health. Environmental groups added their voice to that of 
other critics and targeted the industry as an environmental priority. By 1998 the Total 
Environment Centre, along with various rural-based environment groups, was lobbying 
government to introduce regulatory controls to protect people and the environment from 
pesticide pollution generated by the cotton industry due to their heavy use of pesticides. 
They alleged that “[it is] now blatantly obvious that the cotton industry can’t stop 
pesticides trespassing on other people’s property or the environment”.21 
 
There was by this time, according to both industry and other respondents, a widespread 
perception that cotton farmers were guilty of “environmental rape and pillage”, and that 
the cotton industry had become, as one industry insider put it: “the signature villain”. 
This perception also had political repercussions. Responding to the endosulfan crisis in 
early 1999, Federal Agriculture Minister Mark Vaile warned that sanctions, including 
severe fines, could face cotton growers who flouted agreements on the use of chemical 
sprays in the summer season. “We are not prepared to allow the good reputation of 
Australia’s export beef industry to be put at risk” Vaile told reporters, “the majority of 
operators in the cotton industry are abiding by codes of management and practice but 
there are some who aren’t and they must be brought into line”.22 Farmers feared that 
tougher regulation would restrict their farming practices, curtail or prohibit aerial 
spraying and inhibit or prevent them from using particular chemicals. The threat of a total 
ban on endosulfan, which would have caused very considerable economic loss, remained 
uppermost in their minds.  
                                                 
19 NSW Environment Protection Authority and New England Health (2000) Pesticides in Rainwater tanks 
Namoi Valley NSW. 
20 “Numerous scientific studies have not found any evidence of involvement in cancer, birth defects, 
damage to genetic material [or any other long-term effects] due to chronic low level exposure” in Review 
of Endosulfan: National Registration Authority ECRP, Aug 1998. 
21 Total Environment Centre (2003) Cotton Industry’s Secret Anti-Environment Campaign Plan Released” 
accessed at http://www.nccnsw.org.au/member/tec/news/media/19980626_cotman.html on 25 April 2003. 
See also “Gunnedah: A community in crisis over pesticides” Total Environment Centre, Sydney, 1997 p 
23.  
22 Australian Associated Press, “Govt warns it is cracking down on cotton chemical use”, 10 Feb 1999. 
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To make matters worse, the Total Environment Centre unearthed a confidential 
consultancy report commissioned by the cotton industry that allegedly revealed a “secret 
anti-environment campaign”.23 The report not only contained admissions about serious 
environmental and community problems but also a series of suggestions about how these 
groups should be managed. For example, the document stated “it is not conducive to 
establishing good relations to refer to withholding advertising from newspapers or 
support from various groups if they dare to criticize cotton. If this is done it should be 
done subtly”.24 It also contained tips on how to denigrate environmentalists: “Farmers 
should be seen as ‘conservationists’, the environmentalists as ‘extremists’. Practical 
versus professional conservationists…Environmentalists do not practice what they 
preach. They are hypocritical, self-centred, publicity seekers not involved in agriculture. 
They are dangerous and invite political subversion”.25 The revelation of this document 
served to further damage the industry’s credibility on health and environmental issues. 
 
Thus by the turn of the century the industry faced a variety of pressures and drivers for 
change: the demands of the beef industry, community concerns over the impact of 
pesticide spraying on their health and the environment and environmental group pressure. 
Increasingly stringent environmental and OHS legislation continued to be introduced in 
the Parliament while the increased cost and decreasing efficacy of pesticides due to pest 
resistance made life increasingly difficult for cotton growers around the nation. How 
then, has the industry reacted to the environmental crisis, to the threat to its social license 
and to the various drivers of health and environmental improvement? 
 
B. Industry Initiatives 
Fearing that continuing pressure might result in draconian regulation or the banning of 
certain chemicals and practices, and that the industry’s tarnished image might damage 
export markets and its “license to operate”, the industry has responded by taking action to 
put its own house in order. By taking the initiative, according to one senior Cotton 
Research and Development Corporation (CRDC) official, the industry created “an 
opportunity for growers to manage risks without being told by an ignorant bureaucrat, 
what to do…So the only way to combat this perception runs on the board - to be as far 
ahead of societal pressures as possible”. 
 
However, CRDC and the industry association (Cotton Australia)26 faced considerable 
challenges in achieving substantially improved health and environmental performance. 
Notwithstanding that the latter association is notably well financed and well organised it 
was, as another respondent described it, “caught in the middle with regulatory pressures 
                                                 
23 Total Environment Centre (2003) Cotton Industry’s Secret Anti-Environment Campaign Plan Released” 
accessed at http://www.nccnsw.org.au/member/tec/news/media/19980626_cotman.html on 25 April 2003. 
24 Total Environment Centre (2003) Cotton Industry’s Secret Anti-Environment Campaign Plan Released” 
accessed at http://www.nccnsw.org.au/member/tec/news/media/19980626_cotman.html on 25 April 2003. 
25 Total Environment Centre (2003) Cotton Industry’s Secret Anti-Environment Campaign Plan Released” 
accessed at http://www.nccnsw.org.au/member/tec/news/media/19980626_cotman.html on 25 April 2003. 
26 Cotton Australia is the peak industry body for Australia’s cotton growing industry, responsible for 
advancing the interests of the industry to governments, non-government organizations, the media and the 
community. 
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on one side and unwilling growers on the other”. In this context, how successful has the 
industry been, in achieving its environmental and OHS goals? Will this response be 
sufficient to win it back its credibility and to protect its social license: regaining the trust 
and meeting the expectations of local communities, the wider society and various 
constituent groups? How effective, has been its heavy reliance on VEMAs? 
 
To answer these questions we begin by examining how the cotton industry chose to 
respond to the substantial environmental challenge that it faced. Its principal initiative has 
been the Best Management Practice (BMP) program. This is concerned primarily with 
agricultural chemicals and in particular with reducing pesticide transport off farm, 
bringing greater accountability in the use of pesticides, improving on-farm application of 
pesticides (including integrated pest management) and minimising the impact of 
pesticides on the environment, and on occupational health.27 It was anticipated that the 
industry’s environmental image would be improved and that this would reduce pressure 
from regulators, the community, environmental groups and others. Put differently, BMP 
was intended in the words of one industry official, to “demonstrate a responsible 
approach to quality and environmental risk management”. 
 
Following a modular approach, the industry first developed BMP booklets on a number 
of issues, including pesticide application management, integrated pest management, and 
pesticide storage and handling. Subsequently these were integrated into a BMP Manual 
for growers that also included a risk assessment process for prioritizing issues for action 
and a framework for implementing BMP as well as the suggested best practice solutions. 
Further modules have been developed for OHS and land and water management and 
petrochemical storage and handling. Grower workshops were introduced, to train growers 
in using the manual and implementing BMP, a responsibility that was transferred from 
the Cotton Research and Development Corporation to Cotton Australia. 
 
Underpinning the industry’s approach was a belief in the necessity of: A staged approach; 
engaging and directly involving producers locally; realistic time frames for adoption of 
new practices and systems; demonstrating the practicality and feasibility of recommended 
practices; being flexible and adaptable to local needs; demonstrating the tangible benefits 
to farmers; and engaging strong government support.28 
 
A subsequent and important development was the introduction of the BMP Audit 
Program. Common concerns had been whether growers would be able to verify their 
compliance to BMP, and what type of recognition they would receive for implementing 
BMP. Some took the view that there would be no point implementing BMP unless there 
was some sort of check system in place. In essence, many believed that an audit program 
was necessary to make the process credible and meaningful.29 The audit program that was 
                                                 
27 The integrated pest management plan involves reduced use of more selective and less toxic chemicals, 
growing of genetically modified cotton, non-chemical pest controls and changed farm practices to reduce 
habitat for pests. 
28 Williams, A. (2000) Best Management Practices: The Cotton Model Paper delivered to Australian 
National Pesticide Risk Reduction Workshop. 
29 See Best Management Practices Audit Program, Agency Information Pack, Overview of BMP Program, 
AOD 17, Agency Information Pack, Sept 2000. 
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subsequently developed has two components: the operational system that relates directly 
to growers, and the management system that supports the operational component and 
meets the requirement of an industry-wide accreditation program. The former contains 
three types of audit: an initial Compliance Audit, the Industry Certification Audit, and the 
Surveillance Audit. The audit provides “an objective assessment for growers on where 
improvements can be made to ensure they are meeting their environmental legal 
obligations as well as industry best practices.”30 The underlying philosophy is that of 
continual improvement. 
 
The first audit can be conducted after a grower has completed their BMP manual, which 
involves completion of self-assessment worksheets and the development of documented 
action plans to address issues identified as of concern. This initial audit is concerned with 
establishing a benchmark specific for individual farms, and involves the auditor going 
through the BMP manual and the audit checklist to verify compliance with the manual, 
and documenting both strengths and opportunities for improvement. The subsequent 
Industry Certification Audit (to be conducted within the next 14 months) verifies 
compliance against the BMP manual but also verifies progress on the action plans and on 
the opportunities identified in the initial audit. The Surveillance Audit (within 18 months 
of the Certification Audit) is intended to ensure continual improvement of farm practices, 
and of a grower’s certification to BMP.  The audit itself is conducted by environmental 
auditors trained to conduct BMP audits for the industry, and meeting the standards of the 
Quality Society of Australasia and the International Environmental Auditors Association. 
 
However, audited BMPs are not the end of the health or environmental journey, as the 
industry conceives it. The industry’s ambition is to develop what might broadly be 
termed an environmental management system. If successful, the virtue of this approach is 
to bring about a cultural change within participant organizations, and a “way of going 
about business activities that considers and addresses environmental issues at every 
step”.31 It would incorporate the familiar ‘plan, do, check, act’ approach on which most 
environmental management systems are built, and a commitment to continuous 
improvement. It would also result in the creation of new roles and responsibilities for 
both management and workers and result in the ‘formalisation’ of management styles.32 
 
However, an industry survey suggested that there would be considerable, possibly 
insuperable, challenges in introducing a conventional environmental management system 
such as ISO 14001.33 For example about 50% of growers surveyed did not employ full 
time administrative staff, 65% employed 4 or fewer full time staff, over 70% did not 
employ full-time maintenance staff and about 65% spent less than 10 hours per week on 
                                                 
30 Holloway, R., & Roth, G. (2003) Grower feedback on cotton BMP auditing The Australian Cotton 
Grower, Feb- March, p20. 
31Williams, A., Thomas, R., Pyke B. & Williams, J. (2001) Environmental Management Systems and 
Agriculture- Theory, Practices and Reality- Experiences from the Cotton Industry paper delivered to 
conference on EMS in Australian Agriculture http://www.agric.nsw.gov.au., p 2.  
32 Williams et al, 2001 op cit p 2. 
33 Significantly, the first farmer in Australia to obtain ISO 14001 certification, cotton farmer Mike Logan, 
no longer maintains such certification citing the excessive costs of ISO 14001 and the lack of compensating 
benefits such as discounts on licence fees or other regulatory relief. 
  
 11 
record keeping.34 Moreover, “given that different farmers within an industry or catchment 
will have a diverse range of skills, attitudes, available resources and issues that need 
managing…it is unrealistic to expect all farmers to be able to implement, at the same rate 
(if at all) all the requirements of a formal EMS”.35 
 
Thus the concept the industry has in mind (and one that is ‘poles apart from government 
thinking’) is not a ‘formal EMS’ such as ISO 14001 but rather a form of voluntary 
environmental management arrangement based on the general principles of an EMS.36 
The next step then, is developing the BMP program into a more comprehensive 
environmental management program, gradually introducing many of the ‘formal’ 
components of an EMS. This must be done in a manner that individual small farmers 
would be capable of engaging with, and which relies largely on the approach of existing 
BMPs.37 It would also expand the concept to a ‘whole of farm’ approach rather than 
confining it to one particular issue such as pesticides.38 
 
Another sub-plot, the use of Genetically Modified (GM) cotton, is still being played out. 
While the use of Ingard cotton (genetically modified to secrete a particular pesticide) had 
undoubtedly brought about a reduction in overall spraying, critics of Genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) allege that there remains a danger of cross-fertilisation, and 
of the development of pesticide resistant insects. This is the very reason that Ingard is 
confined to 30% of the overall crop, a restriction developed and strongly supported by the 
cotton industry to ensure the long term viability of the technology. 39 There is little 
constituency for another option - a switch to organic cotton - not least because the 
industry sees little market demand for it, because it would be more expensive to grow and 
of variable quality, and because it would also require substantial changes to the 
processing operation. Arguably, the reduced yields associated with organic cotton are a 
negative from a water efficiency perspective.40 
 
 
C. Government Initiatives 
The industry’s self-regulatory initiatives do not operate in isolation from broader public 
policy. The cotton industry is subject not only to the general environmental and OHS 
legislation which apply to all industries in a particular jurisdiction, but also to a number 
of specific pieces or legislation, regulations and codes of practice. These are targeted 
                                                 
34 Williams, 2001op cit. 
35 Williams, A., Thomas, R., Pyke B. & Williams, J. Environmental Management Systems and Agriculture-
theory, practice and reality- experiences from the cotton industry  undated. 
36 Williams, A. & Williams, J. (2000) Australian Cotton Industry Best Management Practices Manual 
Cotton Research and Development Corporation, Narrabri, NSW. 
37Williams, A., Thomas, R., Pyke B. & Williams, J. Environmental Management Systems and Agriculture-
theory, practice and reality- experiences from the cotton industry  undated. 
38 As such, the goal is high adherence to audited accredited properties working in collaboration with 
colleague industries integrated into an area wide management sub-catchment. 
39 The APVMA monitors the area planted and figures are crossed checked with Monsanto audited sales 
figures for particular areas. 
40 However, on the virtues of organic cotton see the Sustainable Cotton Project: 
http://www.sustainablecotton.org/SUScP/index.html accessed 21 August 2003. 
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either at cotton directly or at issues  which have been major problems within the cotton 
industry such as pesticide exposure and management. 
 
In broad terms, the cotton industry’s principal environmental obligations include41 a 
general environmental duty on every person not to undertake an activity that pollutes or 
might pollute the environment unless they take all reasonable and practicable measures to 
prevent or minimize environmental harm.42 In both Queensland and New South Wales, a 
range of specific obligations in relation to air and water quality must be undertaken.43 For 
example, section 120 of the New South Wales Protection of the Environment Operations 
Act specifies (subject to certain defences) that a person must not pollute waters or cause 
or permit waters to be polluted. The New South Wales Pesticides Act and regulations are 
also important, particularly with regard to obligations to keep records on pesticides 
applications, and in terms of handling and use practices.44 The Act creates offences for 
off-farm damage to people, property, plants and animals. At federal level, the National 
Registration Authority for Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals, (now the AVPMA) 
sets maximum residue levels for chemicals that are adopted by State Authorities 
responsible for agriculture45. It is also responsible for approving and registering 
chemicals. Following the endosulfan crisis it suspended registration of ultra low volume 
(ULV) formulations of endosulfan and imposed strict conditions on use of remaining 
stocks.46 However, Australia still has no systematic process for capturing pesticide use 
data or recording adverse incidents with pesticides and this in turn severely limits 
responsive pesticide management. 
 
In regards to occupational health and safety, employers in New South Wales have a broad 
general duty to ensure the safety, health and welfare of employees at work (subject to a 
defence of reasonable practicability).47 In Queensland, a somewhat different route 
achieves a broadly similar result.48 A variety of other duty holders have comparable 
general duties. These duties are underpinned by regulations, advisory standards, codes of 
practice and ministerial notices. In this regard, the Code of practice for the safe use and 
storage of chemicals (including pesticides and herbicides) in agriculture is of particular 
importance.49 There is a particular emphasis (particularly in the New South Wales 
legislation) on hazard assessment, risk analysis and control.50 The broad range of 
environmental, OHS and related regulatory obligations imposed on the cotton industry is 
indicated in Appendix 1. 
                                                 
41 In Queensland but not New South Wales. 
42 s 36, Environment Protection Act 1994 (Qld). 
43 For example s 120, Protection of the Environment Operations Act (NSW). See generally Bates G 
Environmental Law in Australia 5th Edition, (2002) Ch 15, Butterworths, Sydney. 
44 Pesticides Amendment (Records) Regulation under the Pesticides Act 1999 (NSW). 
45 A MRL for endosulfan is measured in meat, not in pasture or on the crop itself. 
46 Other restrictions contemplated include limiting application to three sprays per season, mandatory prior 
notice to neighbours before spraying within specified buffer zones ad restringing use to the months between 
November and January, mandatory downwind buffer zones and adoption of technology that will reduce 
spray drift.  
47 Part 2, Div 1 Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW).  
48 See s 24, Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld); Johnstone, 1997. 
49 http://www.workcover.nsw.gov.au accessed 10/08/03. 
50 Johnstone, R. (1997) Occupational Health and Safety Law and Policy LBC, Sydney Ch 5. 
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D. Self-Regulation vs. Government Regulation? 
It is common for policy analysts, regulators, industry associations, and other stakeholders 
to view self-regulation and government regulation as the main policy alternatives and to 
ask which of those two approaches is the most appropriate to the circumstances of a 
particular industry. Needless to say, different stakeholder groups tend to take up widely 
differing but somewhat predictable positions on this issue. 
 
Each approach has both strengths and weaknesses. For example, traditional regulation 
carries a strong moral message (it is wrong to disobey the law) and has a high credibility 
rating amongst the wider community because its health and environmental improvement 
targets are perceived as independently imposed and enforced. It usually sets out well-
defined and measurable requirements, which, having the force of law, can compel 
change. Crucially, in most surveys, legislation is identified as the single most important 
reason given by business for improving its health or environmental performance. For 
example, a 1997 survey found legal requirements were the dominant reason for making 
environmental improvements by both primary and secondary industry.51 
 
However, in respect of the rural sector in general, coercion is a particularly blunt 
instrument, a problem compounded by the poor design of many regulatory regimes. 
Enforcement in particular is highly problematic. The cotton industry includes a 
substantial number of relatively small farms spread over a significant geographical area, 
making it difficult to police the law effectively. Monitoring and inspection are resource 
intensive activities yet the various regulatory authorities have serious resource limitations 
and numerous other responsibilities. Except for those periods when the cotton industry 
has been the focus of public and political attention (especially the endosulfan crisis) the 
relevant regulatory agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency and 
WorkCover, devote only very limited attention to the industry. NSW EPA for example, 
reports that it is in enforcement terms, entirely reactive, responding only to substantial 
incidents that are brought to its attention (usually informally or with administrative 
notices) but not initiating action. Enforcement problems are exacerbated by difficulties of 
monitoring and identifying the source of much agricultural chemical pollution. The result 
is that the gap between the law on the books, and the law in action, is a substantial one, 
and from day to day, regulation has only a very modest impact on the practices of 
individual cotton farmers. 
 
Even where direct regulation is practicable, it is not necessarily desirable. Some 
regulations may inhibit innovation and discourage people from searching for more 
efficient ways to use a resource.52 Uniform standards, while less costly to develop and to 
administer, fail to account for variations in the robustness of ecosystems, or changing 
climatic conditions. In circumstances where what is needed are positive measures to 
reverse degradation, in conjunction with the development of an ethic of environmental 
stewardship, then traditional regulation has little to contribute. It neither encourages a 
                                                 
51 Environment Protection Authority NSW, 1997, p 61. 
52 For example a 10 year lease may inhibit long term planning and encourage the pursuit of short-term 
profit. 
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sense of ownership of environmental problems and solutions or is conducive to changing 
attitudes to environmental management and engendering a ‘custodianship ethic’. 
 
Moreover, such regulatory standards as do govern agricultural practices can themselves 
be unwieldy. Agricultural practices that are damaging in some contexts may be relatively 
harmless in others. Differentiated standards on the other hand, entail greater 
administrative and enforcement costs. Relevant regulatory responsibilities may be 
distributed across a number of agencies, including those responsible for air quality, water 
quality and food safety. Finally, the sheer volume of regulation makes it very difficult for 
small farmers to assimilate. As Williams points out: “a brief list of issues confronting 
farmers includes pesticide management , land and water management plans, catchment 
management plans, vegetation management plans greenhouse gas emissions, salinity 
action plans, codes of practice and quality assurance programs- all before the tractor is 
started!”.53 
  
At the other end of the policy spectrum to traditional regulation lies self-regulation 
applied under the auspices of an industry association, such as the cotton industry BMP 
initiative described above. There are a number of attractions to self-regulation, many of 
which are the converse of the problems of traditional regulation. That is, self-regulation is 
not dependent on external regulatory inspectorates, is more acceptable to many (although 
by no means all) farmers and so less likely to induce regulatory resistance. Furthermore, 
self regulation is much more likely to be tailored to the individual circumstances and 
needs of individual agricultural enterprises while being introduced at much lower cost 
than government regulation and providing a much greater degree of ownership amongst 
those enterprises. 
 
Not only do self-regulatory initiatives nurture greater ownership of outcomes than do 
external interventions, but the industry has informal means of bringing pressure to bear 
on those who are unwilling to participate in industry initiatives. For example, the power 
of peer group pressure can be considerable. Thus it was pointed out that: “your 
neighbours aren’t thrilled if they are investing in practices which improve the image of 
the entire industry, only to see over the fence, the old, and environmentally careless 
approach being adopted.” Some even suggested that industry-led initiatives such as BMP, 
can lead to a ‘race to the top’. One proactive farmer argued that: “now they want to out-
compete each other to achieve their environmental targets - after the fish kills people they 
finally recognized ‘it was us’. Then the industry asked people to accept responsibility 
[and now] its almost a competition to be the most environmental cotton farm-it’s a self-
perpetuating thing - we know we can do it - and people are proving it by making money 
out of it”. 
 
However unlike government regulation, self-regulation lacks credibility with external 
stakeholders. It is widely regarded as a sham, and as a cynical attempt to give the 
appearance of regulation while serving private interests at the expense of the public, 
thereby avoiding more direct and effective forms of environmental control such as direct 
                                                 
53 Williams, A., Thomas, R., Pyke B. & Williams, J. Environmental Management Systems and Agriculture-theory, 
practice and reality- experiences from the cotton industry undated. 
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government regulation. Sceptics of self-regulation may reside in environmental 
organisations, government agencies and/or the general community. The experience of 
self-regulation in a number of industries operating in a variety of jurisdictions points to 
the following failings that have given rise to this credibility problem: 
• An inherent incentive for unmotivated members to “free ride” on the efforts of others; 
• An unwillingness and/or incapacity on the part of the responsible industry association 
to impose sanctions on recalcitrant members; 
• A lack of transparency and accountability, making it difficult for external parties to 
determine if genuine environmental progress has been achieved; and 
• A potential conflict between short term, profit driven self-interest and the need for 
long term investments in environmental improvement.54 
 
Notwithstanding the challenges to effective self-regulation, the Australian cotton industry 
arguably has a number of characteristics that are conducive to the success of that 
approach. Not least, the industry association is well resourced (having a substantial 
industry levy), highly organised and has the capacity to approach, negotiate and work 
with individual cotton farmers with a united and coherent voice. For example, industry 
representatives argued that the BMP program has been successful because: 
we have people dedicated to putting it into place. If you just throw the documents at 
farmers, and they’re just process based documents, then its useless because farmers are 
more interested in getting their hands dirty than in going through processes. The documents 
just identify processes, but not solutions. We help them go through the process and our 
documents have solutions to high-risk situations. If they just tick boxes, there is no 
ownership, no implementation; its essential to have somebody on the ground, telling them 
what it means on their land. 
 
The industry itself is also technologically sophisticated, less conservative than most and 
more open to change. Growers are relatively young (the average age of cotton farmers is 
approximately ten years younger than in the dairy industry), as is the industry itself (just 
over 40 years old). As such, there is considerable scope for achieving shifts in behaviour. 
Much however, depends upon how this task is approached, with farmers and industry 
representatives arguing strongly that what is needed is a co-operative approach from 
within. As one cotton farmer argued, “the key is giving farmers room to develop their 
own solutions - everybody goes wrong by not giving people who need to develop their 
own solutions, the power to develop them - and its going to make more money … but the 
bureaucrats can’t come up with any creative incentives- they can’t dis-empower 
themselves!”. 
 
Most important of all, the industry has experienced very considerable pressure relating to 
its health and environmental performance. Especially in relation to pesticide use, its 
social license has been placed under threat, and it has a strong self-interest in protecting 
its reputation and public image. A failure to do so would threaten its prosperity and 
possibly, its very survival. As one farmer pointed out: “Fear [of being closed down] is a 
                                                 
54Priest, M., (1998-1999) The privatization of regulation: Five models of self-regulation Ottowa Law 
Review Volume 29. 
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blunt instrument but out of it we became self-driven. Now we are off the EPA radar but 
we’re still doing things. It’s become a race: who can become the most sustainable?” For 
another “the outside pressure triggers something that is already there- farmers are not 
vandals- they want to do the right thing- and they understand nature better than most –
and they understand that if they do something wrong it will backfire”. 
 
Finally, many of the measures it is seeking to persuade its members to adopt under its 
BMP initiative, promise economic benefits to those members. Specifically, the industry is 
highly competitive, strongly export-oriented and, with tight profit margins, must focus on 
smart means of protecting or expanding those margins. BMP offers one such means. 
Thus a common view was that: “BMP focused people on managing expensive inputs 
better”. As another respondent pointed out: “if we hadn’t shifted to BMP we’d be broke- 
the margins are so slim, you’ve got to manage properly to survive. If you spray too often 
you don’t make money because it costs and if you damage the soils your yield declines.” 
However, not all that cotton farmers are exhorted to do in the name of BMP, is win-win. 
There are, for example, few direct costs from spraying off-target, although the 
environmental consequences may be substantial. 
 
Yet notwithstanding that the cotton industry has considerable incentives to self-regulate 
effectively, and that a number of circumstances are conducive to achieving that result, 
progress has been mixed. On the positive side, there is evidence that practices in relation 
to some pesticides improved substantially after the endosulfan crisis and the introduction 
of the BMP program. According to industry consultant Ecos “the results were 
staggering–from having multiple Endosulfan incidents, the industry went to having none 
the next year”.55 Ecos attributed this result to “champions among Cotton Australia’s 
board” and  “a new Cotton Australia management team dedicated to self-regulating the 
industry and improving its chemical and safety performance thorough the best 
management practices system”. Cotton Australia subsequently claimed that endosulfan 
use has dropped 57% over a six year period, 56 although industry critics claim that there is 
no independent corroboration of this figure.57 
 
Industry respondents interviewed for this project similarly claimed substantial gains from 
the BMP initiative. For example good environmental outcomes “come from getting BMP 
and asking: what are the risks?”. In contrast “there used to be chemicals just poured out 
of drums and the drum then burned or buried” and “there used to be chippers who went 
straight back into the crop after spraying” but these were reported to be things of the past. 
“You won’t see a person in the paddocks mixing chemicals with no mask any more”. 
Now, “the cotton BMP people have made people aware of the whole growing chain – [of 
                                                 
55 Ecos Corporation: Cotton Australia http://www.ecoscorporation.com/clients/cotton.htm accessed 10 Aug 
2003. 
56 Cotton Australia Fact Sheets, Environment (2003) http://www.cottonaustralia.com.au/aboutindex.html 
accessed 23 August 2003. This figure is based on chemicals sales figures that are a reasonable 
approximation for chemical use.  However, industry representatives concede that in part, the reduction may 
reflect particularly low chemical density in one particular season. 
57 Industry association officials report that the figure is based on reports and records of pesticide use of a 
selection of users and from information supplied by other industry associations (e.g. AAAA, Cotton 
Consultants Association, CAPA). 
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the benefits associated with] BMP and ploughing back…BMP is good at making you 
look at the whole year’s production and the whole year’s planning”. The introduction of 
specific technology was also said to have made a substantial difference to health and 
environmental performance: air monitors with regard to aerial spraying, closed systems 
for chemicals distribution and container management were amongst the examples given. 
“Moderate” environmental groups broadly concurred with this assessment, regarding the 
BMP program as having ‘huge potential’ and as already being “pretty good”. However, 
other environmental groups and community activists, remained sceptical. As one 
environmentalist put it: “they’ve been real bastards in the past. They have treated people 
appallingly. Of course people have no trust, no faith in them now”. 
 
Most recently, the second environmental audit of the cotton industry (by consultants 
GHD) found evidence of considerable environmental improvement across a range of 
issues, including “a high level of compliance …with respect to aerial spraying, chemical 
use and OHS, pesticide storage, spray drift management, integrated pest management and 
research. A lower level of compliance was found for nuisance odour and the disposal and 
recycling of pesticide containers”.58 However, it found that there were still areas where 
significant environmental improvements could be achieved (including pest management 
and pesticide use). Stakeholders interviewed also agreed that there had been a general 
reduction in pesticide usage (although it still remains substantial) and environmental and 
community groups still viewed spray drift with concern and regarded pesticide use as one 
of the two top environmental priorities for the industry. The audit also confirmed that, 
while there was considerable variation in the standard of OHS practices across farms, 
“there appeared to be greater progress made towards good OH&S practices on farms 
which had implemented BMP guidelines. A number of farmers are currently addressing 
OH&S issues and improved practices were observed. However, not all farms employed 
these good practices”.59 
 
Substantial progress has also been made in terms of auditing the BMP program – 
something essential not only to its longer-term success but also to its credibility with 
external stakeholders. By January 2002 initial compliance audits had been conducted on 
20% of cotton growers in the industry, covering 45% of the cotton areas grown in 2001-
2002. Over 90% of respondents to a subsequent survey felt the audit was of significant 
benefit, while only 1% believed the audit was not worthwhile.60 The second cotton 
industry environmental audit moreover, found that: 
the [BMP] audit identified a direct link between the areas of improvement observed on the 
properties and the BMP modules available to the growers at the time of the audit. Farmers 
that had undertaken their second BMP audit showed real improvements in environmental 
management, and the auditing process provided a benchmark to indicate that progress had 
                                                 
58 Cotton Research and Development Corporation (August 2003) Second Australian Cotton Industry 
Environmental Audit http://www.crdc.com.au/ accessed 28 August 2003.p 2. 
59 Cotton Research and Development Corporation (August 2003) Second Australian Cotton Industry 
Environmental Audit http://www.crdc.com.au/ accessed 28 August 2003.p 5. 
60 Holloway, R., & Roth, G. (2003) Grower feedback on cotton BMP auditing The Australian Cotton 
Grower, Feb- March. 
p 20. The response rate in the survey was approximately 50%. 
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been made. It was observed that farms practicing BMP generally had better environmental 
management practices, as well as superior documentation and records management.61 
 
However, the most obvious limitation to the BMP program, even in its most recent 
manifestation, is its inability to engage with the ‘bottom end’ of the industry. Even after 
six years or more, there remain a substantial minority who are as yet untouched, by the 
BMP program. Quite how large this group may be, or how resistant they may be to 
change, can only be matters of speculation as the present researcher was unable to glean 
significant information from this group. Just as some cotton farmers refuse to allow an 
auditor on their property they can also show no inclination to discuss their practices with 
external researchers. Certainly some farmers may be well advanced in terms of achieving 
their responsibilities under the BMP program, albeit reluctant for a variety of reasons to 
have a formal assessment. However, there are likely to be substantial numbers of others 
who have made very little progress, and indeed are not part of the program at all. Over 
this group, the industry association has little if any influence. As one report pointed out: 
“the diversity of different organisations involved in the industry also has implications for 
any moves to improve its environmental performance. In contrast to a single company the 
cotton industry cannot dictate absolute requirements for individual members”.62 One 
industry leader acknowledged the limitation of the industry association role in blunter 
terms: “it’s not the industry’s job to police the laggards, it’s just a voluntary association 
working for the common interest. It has no means of compelling people to do things: they 
will tell you to get stuffed”. 
 
Yet if the industry is unsuccessful in dealing with recalcitrance, it may, in the longer 
term, be unsuccessful in protecting its social license and in achieving its broader 
environmental ambitions. Certainly the industry association has to move gradually. As 
Waskom and Walker argue: “The local, voluntary approach to solving [environmental] 
problems related to agriculture may progress more slowly than many in the 
environmental community deem acceptable. However, it should be understood that 
change occurs somewhat slowly in agriculture due to the extremely risky nature of 
farming- allowing the users of agricultural chemicals to (in a sense) self regulate their 
activities produces an innovative and acceptable method of solving a problem that would 
be very difficult for the state to effectively regulate”.63 
 
Yet there is reason to doubt whether even a gradual ‘softly softly’ approach, will, even 
over the long term, penetrate to the poorer environmental performers. First, it is now 
nearly 4 years since the first audit, and, for whatever reasons, still only 30% of the 900-
1000 growers in the industry (50% by area) have submitted to an independent audit. 
While a significant number of the others may be well on their way to compliance with 
BMPs, there is no evidence to suggest and no reason to believe that this will be the case 
for those at the bottom end. (Industry insiders guess some 70% may formally or 
                                                 
61 Cotton Research and Development Corporation, op cit pp 3-4. 
62 Gibb Environmental Services and Arbour (1991) An Environmental Audit of the Australian Cotton 
Industry, p 129. 
63 Waskom, RM., & Walker, LR. (undated) Involving agricultural producers in development of localized 
best management practices Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado. 
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informally be heading down the BMP route, and feel that shifting the remainder will be 
very difficult). The perception is that: “it would take something fairly big to move them” 
and “we can only speculate what these guys are doing”. If we turn to the evidence 
concerning the effectiveness of other advanced, sophisticated industry self-regulatory 
initiatives, even the best fail to deal with a substantial number of laggards.64 
 
 
II. WHERE NEXT? 
 
One might reasonably conclude that direct government regulation will be very 
unattractive to members of the industry (who point to the virtues and achievements of 
self-regulation) while self-regulation will be equally unconvincing to external 
stakeholders (who doubt the industry’s claims and point in particular to the manifest bad 
practices at the ‘bottom end’). While the industry may have done enough to ward off 
further government regulation in the absence of a new environmental crisis, this may not 
be sufficient to achieve its broader aspirations. In particular, to protect its social license; 
something it needs to do not only to maintain its credibility within Australia, but also to 
protect its export markets. How could the cotton industry self-regulatory initiative be 
modified so as to both achieve further improvements in the industry’s environmental 
performance and to protect its social licence? Two discrete questions are involved. First, 
what internal characteristics are most likely to make self-regulation both effective and 
credible to the industry’s critics? Second, how can self-regulation be linked with other 
policy instruments or external pressures in order to increase its effectiveness and 
credibility?  
 
A. Internal Design Features 
(i) Health and environmental targets 
In order to ‘test by results’ and equally important, in order to convince skeptical third 
parties that claimed improvements in performance are genuine, it is crucial that a self-
regulatory initiative develop clearly defined targets. It can be argued that concrete targets 
are impossible to achieve in the early stages and that it is better for participants to feel 
their way, rather than resisting (and perhaps refusing to enter) a program which might 
commit them to non-attainable targets, or ones which, in retrospect, it is uneconomic to 
achieve. It is far better in these circumstances to begin with good faith obligations of a 
general nature and process based obligations (for example in terms of developing and 
implementing BMPs). 
  
This is essentially the current stage of the BMP program, although some of the BMPs at 
least, are capable of being quantified in objective terms.65 But the object to date has not 
been to give a pass/fail mark, or to compare one farm with another. On the contrary, the 
                                                 
64  Haufler, V (2001) The Public Role of the Private Sector, Industry Self-regulation in a Global Economy 
Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC. 
65 For example, in terms of application of pesticides, while most of the practices specified in the BMP 
Manual are process based (e.g. establishing good pre-season communication with neighbours, using 
integrated pest management) some are outcome based, to the extent for example, that level 3 (of the 4 
levels on which the audit is scaled- 1 being the highest) would satisfy current regulatory standards. 
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goal has been to deliver “an individual management tool for growers that provides them 
with an objective and external verification of their progress, improvement and also areas 
where improvement can be made”.66 However, such an approach focuses on systems 
rather than outcome-based standards, leaving the setting of goals to individual 
participants. In the case of mature self-regulatory initiatives, the adoption of identified 
outcomes and targets is highly desirable.67 Without them, there is the risk that the 
initiative may become vacuous, degenerate into “greenwash”, and lose credibility. 
 
A desirable next step therefore is to develop performance indicators on key criteria, and 
to require self-assessment and disclosure subject to random and independent third party 
audit (for example, monitoring and testing of water quality and pesticide residue in any 
water running off the property). Precisely such an approach was urged by the second 
cotton industry environmental audit: “Key environmental performance indicators, by 
which the performance of the cotton industry as a whole, and at individual farms can be 
objectively assessed, need to be developed by the cotton industry”.68 The 2001 document 
on Fostering Best Management Practices, proposed a range of performance indicators: 
(management performance indicators, operational performance indicators, and 
environment condition indicators) and identified in some detail what those indicators 
might be.69 What has not so far been contemplated however, is the direct involvement of 
third parties, such as environmental groups in the standard setting process itself, yet 
without this, the credibility of the standards themselves may be in doubt. For example, 
there remains a serious danger that the industry association will ‘self-select’ the risks, 
measures and targets.70 
 
(ii) Monitoring, audit and verification 
To the extent that a code relies on self-reporting as the principal means of monitoring, it 
will lack credibility with external stakeholders and the public in general. For example, 
some environmental groups dispute the industry’s claim to have reduced endosulfan use 
by 57%, and maintain, even it is accurate, it might well be accounted for by changing 
weather conditions or regulatory pressure rather than by the success of the industry’s own 
efforts. The cotton industry has clearly recognised its credibility problems and the 
development of the audit program goes some way to meet the critics’ concerns. However, 
while auditors are ‘third parties’ in relation to the farmer being audited, the auditors are 
‘second parties’ associated with the industry, in that they are industry trained and 
supported, and with industry experience. Whilst this gives them insight, understanding, 
and a rapport with those they are auditing, the downside is that they are not perceived to 
                                                 
66  Best Management Practices Audit Program (Sept 2000) Agency Information Pack, Overview of BMP 
Program, AOD 17, Agency Information Pack., 2000 p 6. 
67 For example, a chemical concentration below x% within 100 meters of a watercourse.  
68 Cotton Research and Development Corporation (August 2003) Second Australian Cotton Industry 
Environmental Audit http://www.crdc.com.au/ accessed 28 August 2003. p 4. 
69 Williams, A. (2001a) Fostering best management practices in natural resource management- toward an 
environmental management system in the cotton industry Australian Cotton Growers Association, Cotton 
Research and Development Corporation and Murray-Darling Basin Commission..  
70 Heinz, K., (2000) Credible ‘Clean and Green: Investigation of the International Framework and Critical 
Design Features of a Credible EMS for Australian Agriculture CSIRO Land and Water, Canberra.p 8. 
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be at “arms length” and as such their credibility is may be undermined in the eyes of 
critical third parties. 
 
In the long term, even environmental groups who credit the cotton industry with 
considerable environmental improvement believe that independent third party verification 
(of at least a random sample of industry audits) will be essential to maintain the 
credibility of the BMP program.71 As one NGO representative put it: “whether they have 
50% participation in audits or 90% it doesn’t make any difference- the question is what 
does it do for the environment, and unless they can demonstrate that [we remain 
unconvinced]”.  Independent verification will also be important to the cotton industry if it 
wants to build market confidence that the health and environmental claims are actually 
being delivered. Suppliers and other commercial third parties will want the reassurance 
that comes from subjecting the measuring/monitoring/auditing arrangements to outside 
scrutiny. The need for independent external audits was recognized by the 2001 document 
on Fostering Best Management Practices but its recommendation has not so far been 
acted upon.72 However, industry leaders recognise the compelling case for heading down 
this path in the future. 
 
Other industry associations who have introduced self-regulatory initiatives have similarly 
been reluctant to adopt third party audits, but have paid the price. For example, when the 
chemical industry associations responsible for administering Responsible Care 
announced yearly compliance figures based on their member companies ‘ticking the 
boxes’ and returning questionnaires, these statistics were greeted with great skepticism by 
external audiences, and as tantamount to students grading their own exam papers. Only 
very belatedly is Responsible Care turning to external verification and independent audit 
as a means of providing credible monitoring and reporting. The leader in this respect is 
Canada, where an external team comprising two industry and two non-industry 
representatives (one from the local community) conduct such audits. 
 
(iii) Dealing with free-riders 
A problem arises with self-regulation because, although each individual enterprise may 
benefit from its success (as when a BMP program will enhance the reputation and 
competitive position of the entire industry), each will benefit even if it does not 
participate, provided that others do. It is rational therefore, for individual enterprises to 
"free ride"; to defect or engage only in token compliance, in effect seeking to benefit 
from the collective scheme without paying.  For example, 80% of the industry may agree 
to comply with a code of practice, or BMPs, but 20% may simply refuse to sign on. If so, 
a failure to address the misconduct of the latter (which since they are outside of the code, 
is beyond the scope of the self regulatory scheme) will almost certainly result in the 
failure of the code. This is because those who sign the code cannot afford to be put at a 
competitive disadvantage as against those who do not. In such circumstances, if the 20% 
                                                 
71 This is consistent with the view of the Second Australian Cotton Industry Environmental Audit, Cotton 
Research and Development Corporation, August 2003, http://www.crdc.com.au/ accessed 28 August 2003, 
p 4.  
72 Williams, A. Fostering Best Management Practices In Natural Resource Management- Towards An 
Environmental Management System in the Cotton Industry Australian Cotton Research Council, 2001a.  
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cannot be induced to participate by threats or incentives provided by other players, then 
self-regulation can only work if government intervenes directly curb the activities of non-
participants. 
 
In the case of the cotton industry, the industry association lacks the power to impose 
credible sanctions on non-participants. For example, expulsion from the industry 
association for non-compliance would have little impact. This is a major reason why 
"pure" self-regulation is rarely successful, and why there is a compelling need, even with 
many of the best of self-regulatory programs, to complement self-regulation with some 
form of government or third party involvement. We explore this issue further in the next 
section below. 
 
(iv) Transparency 
Transparency will be a critical feature of a code’s credibility with the general public. 
Transparency can take a number of forms. In part, it implies that the decision-making 
process itself (for example, how BMP standards are determined, by what criteria etc) 
should itself be open to scrutiny. So far this has been the case only to the extent that: a) 
all relevant legislation was used as the fundamental starting point for determining the best 
practices, and b) all relevant regulatory authorities were given ample opportunity to 
comment on a draft of the second edition. 
 
Transparency also implies not only the establishment of a workable set of performance 
indicators, taking the form of quantifiable or qualitative measurements, but also periodic 
independent and accessible reports on progress in achieving these objectives. If the 
principle of transparency is taken to its logical conclusion then it would require 
considerable disclosure of practices on individual farms. One important development 
required both by regulation and BMPs is for growers to notify their neighbours in 
advance of spraying, disclosing details of pesticides to be used, the areas to be sprayed 
and other relevant health and environmental considerations. This has already resulted in a 
considerable lessening of tension between growers and neighbouring farms. 
 
If such performance indicators are developed in negotiation with third parties such as 
environmental groups (as recommended above), they will provide important and credible 
measures for evaluating and criticising its performance. At present, the industry has not 
placed any emphasis on transparency, preferring to continue developing its BMP program 
in-house to a higher standard. However, the 2003 Cotton Industry Second Environmental 
Audit is an important publicly available document produced by external industry 
consultants, and could form the basis for continued, more systemic public reporting.  
 
(v) Whole of property approach 
Although focus of this paper is on pesticide use, it is important to emphasise that in the 
longer term, an effective BMP or EMS should address key environmental issues across 
the entire property. This would include land and water use, quality and biodiversity, as 
well as pesticide use and management (as is indeed the case). To do otherwise would be 
to invite farmers to confine their efforts to areas that they find easiest to manage (and 
claim credit for), while remaining silent on others. It is also the case that cotton farms 
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form part of broader catchments and that many environmental problems are best dealt 
with at catchment level. If catchment boards set regional targets, and if targets under the 
BMP program (and in the future under an industry wide EMS) are designed to integrate 
with those regional targets, far greater environmental progress will be achieved. 
However, persuading farmers to enter into a property wide plan remains a substantial 
challenge since many farms have multiple crops and so are not under the influence of a 
single industry association or a single self-regulatory initiative. 
 
B. Combining Self-Regulation With Other Policy Instruments and External 
Pressures? 
The policy debate about the relative virtues of government and self-regulation tends to be 
conducted in dualistic terms - public regulation versus private regulation – as if it were 
inevitable to have to choose between them. This way of thinking about regulation 
obscures the continuities and dynamic connections between public and private regulation, 
and overlooks how these regulatory spheres coexist and interact. As Ayres & 
Braithwaite) put it: 
Good policy analysis is not about choosing between the free market and government 
regulation...If we accept that sound policy analysis is about understanding private 
regulation....and how it is interdependent with state regulation, then interesting possibilities 
open up to steer the mix of private and public regulation. It is this mix, this interplay, that 
works to assist or impede solution of the policy problem.73 
 
Rather than thinking about self-regulation and government regulation as alternatives, it is 
more productive to explore ways in which they can be combined in a complementary 
manner (and often in conjunction with other mechanisms), so that the strengths of each 
can be maximised and their weaknesses compensated for. Achieving this result however, 
is likely to be a major challenge which the cotton industry, like many other industry 
sectors, has not yet addressed successfully. 
 
A starting point may be to think in terms not of self-regulation, but of co-regulation. This 
need not be a radical shift. Indeed, the leading examples of what purport to be industry 
self-regulation, actually involve varying degrees of interaction with government 
regulation, and might more accurately be described as such.74 For present purposes, the 
use the term co-regulation is used to refer to a hybrid policy instrument involving a 
combination of government set targets and industry-based implementation, with the latter 
element being underpinned by government controls.75 This use of the term co-regulation 
resonates strongly with the concept of “industry self-management” which describes the 
transfer of the responsibility for administering legislation and regulations from 
government to industry, and involves industry councils or similar bodies delivering 
                                                 
73Ayres, I., & Braithwaite, J. (1992) Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford 
University Press, New York. p 102-103. 
74 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Gunningham and Rees, 1997. 
75 Gunningham, N., & Grabosky, P. (1998) Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy Ch 4 OUP 
United Kingdom.p 50-56. 
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services and programs in specific markets.76 Ideally, this is a policy strategy that leaves 
the government free to focus on its core business of setting policy directions and 
establishing environmental and safety standards. It means tapping into sectoral best 
practices and letting industry deliver the services themselves. 
 
But how should co-regulatory mechanisms best be designed, in order to take advantage of 
the strengths and virtues of industry self-regulation, while compensating for its 
weaknesses as a stand-alone mechanism? It will be argued that this implies an 
underpinning of state intervention sufficient to ensure that it does operate in the public 
interest, that it is effective in achieving its purported social and economic goals and has 
credibility in the eyes of the public or its intended audience. But what does this mean? 
 
It is crucial that the cotton industry’s own initiatives operate in the shadow of rules and 
sanctions provided by the general law, for it is these which are the most obvious and 
visible (but not the only) means of giving cotton growers themselves the incentive to 
comply with the self-regulatory program. For example, farmers, including cotton farmers, 
are highly resistant to documenting their activities. Yet doing so is an important part of 
developing a systematic approach to safety, health and environmental issues and an 
integral part of a BMP program. The New South Wales Pesticide Regulations, for 
example, require the keeping of formal records concerning pesticide use and application, 
which serve in practice, to encourage and reinforce the industry’s BMP initiative. As a 
result, those who have adopted BMP will find it considerably easier to satisfy the 
regulatory requirements, and this documentation in turn will demonstrate how BMP 
actually leads to less pesticide use, and with it, tangible economic benefits as well as 
safety, health and environmental improvements. Beyond this, the stricter monitoring of 
chemicals and documenting their health and environmental impact on a broader scale, is 
something that only government has the resources and power to do. However, it seems 
that this undertaking has so far failed, there being “no systematic process for capturing 
pesticide use data or recording adverse incidents with pesticides”.77 
 
The general law can make other important contributions to reinforcing the industry’s own 
initiatives. For example, the BMP program now includes regular audits, but if farmers 
fear that such audits might be accessed by government, and used as a basis for 
prosecution, they will be reluctant to participate in the audit program. It is here that 
legislation can play an important role by stipulating very clearly that documents prepared 
for the sole purpose of a voluntary environmental audit are protected. As a result, they 
may not be obtained by any regulatory authority or used in evidence against any person 
in any proceedings connected with the enforcement of the regulation in question. This has 
already been done under New South Wales environment protection legislation78, but only 
to a lesser extent in Queensland.79  
                                                 
76 Lonti, Z., & Verma, A., (1999) Industry Self-Managememt as a Strategy for Restructuring Government 
Discussion Paper, W 07, Human Resources in Government Series, Canadian Policy Research Networks, 
Ottowa www.cprn.org/docs/work/cfg_e.pdf 
77 Immig, J. (2003) ULV Endosulfan Formulations Banned… Cows Save the Day! NTN Recent 
Developments http://www.oztoxics.org/ntn/ozstory1.htm (accessed 24 August). 
78 ss 180-182, Protection of the Environment Operations Act, 1997 (NSW). 
79 ss101-108, Environment Protection Act 1994 (Qld).  See also Bates op cit, p 456. 
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Government can also adopt the type of regulatory standards that complement rather than 
conflict with industry self-regulatory initiatives. In particular, performance standards 
(which specify the environmental outcome to be achieved, but not the specific process or 
technology through which to achieve it) allow for much greater flexibility and 
complementary industry initiatives, than do specification standards, which are highly 
prescriptive, and leave little room for innovation and initiative.80 Under the more modern 
style of legislation, government can go further, not only setting out general duties of 
employers and others in very broad terms, but also providing these duties to be clarified 
through endorsed codes of practice. This may leave the door open for negotiation 
between an industry association, government and perhaps third parties as to what the 
code of practice might involve. It also enables these parties to embed in legislation 
initiatives which until then had been voluntarily applied by the industry association, and 
adopted only by those who chose to do so.81 Certainly when a government indicates that 
it expects all firms within a sector to comply with what was previously a voluntary code, 
that is likely to carry considerable weight, given the state’s authority to levy fines and 
revoke business licenses. In this way, self-regulation can ‘raise the regulatory floor’ by 
first demonstrating what can be achieved by good industry performers. Subsequently 
government regulation can endorse this standard (as in endorsed codes of practice), 
making it compulsory for all in the industry and thus curbing free riding.82 Similarly, 
compliance with a voluntary code might be taken as evidence of "due diligence", where 
this is a defence to a penal charge.83 
 
Most important of all, co-regulation works best if there is a credible threat – either of the 
enforcement of existing legislation or of the imposition of stringent new legislation if 
substantial improvement is not achieved voluntarily. This has been recognised for some 
time by the industry itself, which as far back as 1991, argued that “poor 
performers…should be removed from the industry”. Thus the Australian Cotton 
Foundation in its response to an audit in that year, asserted that  “regulatory authorities 
should maintain tighter control of pesticide use as a disincentive against poor standards” 
and urged governments to implement sophisticated monitoring programs.84 
 
However traditional antipathy to regulation in the rural sector generally, the difficulties of 
enforcement in rural areas, and the serious under-resourcing of regulatory agencies have 
                                                 
80 See generally Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999 Ch 2. 
81 For environment see generally, Bates, G. (2002) Environmental Law in Australia 5th Edition, Ch 15, 
Butterworths, Sydney. 
pp 431-435; for Occupational Health and Safety, see Johnstone, R. (1997) Occupational Health and Safety 
Law and Policy LBC, Sydney Ch 5.  
82 Surprisingly, Cotton Australia has elected not to seek endorsement of part of its BMP program under 
Queensland’s code of practice approach. 
83“ In NSW the adoption of best practice does not provide a person or commercial entity with protection 
from prosecution should the legislation be breached. However, the adherence to best practice may be 
relevant to mitigation in any court proceedings and most likely avoid breaches in the first place”: Whyte, R. 
Science, best practice, legislation and environmental performance in Land and Water Resources Research 
and Development Corporation (1998 Conference) Minimising the impact of pesticides on the riverine 
environment: key findings from research within the cotton industry. 
84 Australian Cotton Foundation, undated. 
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resulted in minimal regulation ‘on the ground’. Thus, despite concerns from industry 
leaders and the industry association itself, government has consistently failed to enforce 
the law with any conviction. As one influential grower put it: “it doesn’t make our job 
easy that EPA walks away from responsibility”. And a second confirmed that: “if people 
are caught doing the wrong thing we push for them to cop it - we want them to cop it- but 
EPA has been very quiet”. Another endorsed the same view: “we know agencies are 
fiscally challenged – the word is the DWLC only has two cars – there’s rhetoric on the 
environment but no government resources” and “we wish they would hit the bad guys- 
we’ve begged them for years to prosecute people who let tail waters off their land”. Only 
in conditions of crisis is this situation likely to change but even then, a credible regulatory 
response is by no means guaranteed. For example, one industry leader complained that: 
“during the endosulfan crisis a … grower was caught but let off- it’s a bad signal”. 
Interviews with EPA staff suggested that this situation is unlikely to change and that the 
agency remains almost entirely reactive in its approach to the industry. 
 
Nevertheless, there is very considerable evidence from other industries to suggest that an 
underpinning of government regulation, coupled with (at least a perceived) credible threat 
of inspection and enforcement, is necessary to persuade the reluctant, the recalcitrant and 
the incompetent that other, less coercive, approaches are worth adopting. Yet it must be 
conceded that the numbers of cotton growers so vastly overwhelm the number of 
inspectors that it is wholly impractical to inspect, let alone enforce, against a significant 
number of them. Even so, a significant injection of regulatory resources can achieve a 
great deal and the impression of enforcement can be maintained (in contrast to the current 
what industry insiders characterize as the current ‘regulation by wet lettuce’ approach) 
through a judicious use of targeted enforcement, occasional prosecutions accompanied by 
broad publicity, industry blitzes, and the use of less resource intensive instruments such 
as on-the-spot fines and administrative notices.85 
 
The EPA should reassess its enforcement strategy in the light of these opportunities, 
particularly if Cotton Australia itself is prepared to lend its political support to such 
initiatives rather than seeking to protect recalcitrants within the ranks of its members. 
This point cannot be overemphasized. While privatization and the retreat of the 
regulatory state have been dominant trends in the last two decades, the adverse social and 
environmental consequences of these approaches are too often ignored. This is not to 
advocate a return to traditional ‘command and control’ regulation across the board, but 
rather the need for a more nuanced and cooperative co-regulatory strategy. However, the 
overwhelming majority of evidence-based research suggests that such a strategy, to be 
successful, must be underpinned by regulation and its enforcement and that voluntarism 
alone is almost invariably inadequate.86 
 
                                                 
85 See generally Gunningham, N., & Sinclair, D. (2002) Leaders and Laggards: Next Generation 
Environmental Regulation Greenleaf Publishers, United Kingdom.Ch 2. 
86 See Harrison, K., (2002) Voluntarism and Environmental Governance in Parson, E., (ed) Governing the 
Environment, ch5., OECD (2003) Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Policy: Effectiveness, Efficiency 
and Usage in Policy Mixes OECD, Paris. 
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At present, the failure of government regulation to reinforce the efforts of the industry to 
self-regulate remains a serious obstacle to effective co-regulation, and makes it essential 
that the industry sector and/or government provides positive incentives for farmers to 
participate in the industry’s initiative. There are a variety of options for doing so. For 
example, in Queensland, growers entering the BMP program get 50% off the cost of their 
initial audit with the support of the federal government’s FarmBi$ program. There are 
also incentives under workers’ compensation legislation in New South Wales, whereby 
the cotton industry’s development of an OHS program has enabled it to participate in the 
NSW WorkCover Small Business Premium Discount Scheme.87 However, these 
incentives are relatively modest and Cotton Australia argues that the industry has gained 
no real recognition from government agencies for the considerable work they have done 
in raising health and environmental standards by virtue of the BMP program. As one 
representative put it: “we’ve got no credit for how far we’ve got- nobody in government 
publicly recognises the cotton industry’s progress”. 
 
A much more powerful means for government to reinforce and reward industry self-
regulation would be through ‘fast track’ or ‘performance track’ regulation. This approach 
involves offering incentives to those firms that adopt an environmental management 
system- or arguably best management practices. These incentives can include fast-
tracking of various licenses or permits88, reduced fees, pubic recognition, reduced 
burdens from routine inspections and greater flexibility in means permitted to achieve 
compliance. A central quid pro quo for such regulatory rewards is the agreement to have 
the EMS or BMP certified and externally verified (i.e. by a third party audit).89 In the 
United States, a good example of how government can help foster successful self-
regulation is two-track regulation. 
 
However, the industry remains firmly opposed to the one form of federal government 
support for industry self-regulation currently available- namely the $3000 rebate to a 
farmer adopting an environmental management system, with a cut off for farmers earning 
more than $35,000. As one cotton farmer with considerable experience of the issue put it: 
“it’s a waste of money-there are no outcome based things required –just doing a course 
and developing a plan- and in any event, anyone earning only 35K a year should not be 
on a farm - its not even a tractor driver’s wages - if I only earn 35K its barely survival –
am I going to spend 10% of my income on EMS?”. Strikingly, the first farmer in 
Australia to obtain ISO 14001 certification, Mike Logan, has discontinued participation, 
citing excessive costs and the absence of compensating benefits. He particularly points to 
the absence of significant rewards for EMS participants such as license discounts or other 
forms of regulatory relief. 
 
                                                 
87 More than 150 cotton producers in NSW now participate, qualifying for a 10% reduction in their workers 
compensation premiums. 
88 For example, water licence, chemicals licence, vegetation management plans. 
89 See generally Gunningham, N., & Sinclair, D. (2002) Leaders and Laggards: Next Generation 
Environmental Regulation Greenleaf Publishers, United Kingdom, pp 110-115. 
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C. The Role of Third Parties 
The state is not the only possible institution capable of compensating for the weaknesses 
of self-regulation in its pure form. Sometimes, there may also be a possibility of 
harnessing third parties to act as surrogate regulators; monitoring or policing industry 
initiatives as a complement or alternative to government involvement. It is indeed 
arguable that self-regulation is rarely effective without such involvement. Thus Webb, 
summarising the experience of the 1996 Canadian Symposium of Voluntary Codes, 
concludes: 
Meaningful involvement by consumer and other public interest groups is often what sets 
apart the successful codes from those which have received less support from government 
and the general public. At a time when citizens are better informed, more demanding and 
more skeptical of so-called "elites" (government, industry, the academic and scientific 
communities etc) it is difficult to imagine a situation where a voluntary arrangement could 
succeed without meaningful community, consumer and/or other third party involvement.90  
 
The most obvious third parties with an interest in playing this role are sectoral interest 
groups such as environmental and community groups or NGOs generally, or even rival 
industries such as beef, who can be directly impacted on by the failure of industry self-
regulation. This contribution may be through their direct involvement in administration of 
the code itself (in which case it has greater credibility as a genuinely self regulatory 
scheme) or in their capacity as potential victims of code malpractice (as with local 
communities or the beef industry), in taking direct action against firms that breach the 
self-regulatory program. Other commercial third parties, such as insurance companies, 
lenders, or suppliers of chemicals may also be utilised as surrogate regulators. For 
example, insurance companies have a considerable self-interest in ensuring that they do 
not insure bad risks (and may provide better premiums to those who participate in self-
regulation). 
 
One major consequence of self-regulatory programs that can be made self enforcing - 
whether through harnessing NGOs or others - is that there is consequently far less need 
for direct involvement of government regulators. This force may take a back seat, 
intervening only to the extent that the self enforcing mechanisms break down in practice, 
or need external support in order to make them effective. Indeed, a major role for 
government in these circumstances may be that of facilitator or broker (ensuring the 
effective involvement of appropriate third parties) rather than that of direct participant. 
 
Turning to specifics, it is important to identify the points of greatest leverage over the 
cotton industry. Perhaps the most important of these is the threat the cotton industry faces 
to its social license. Firms who lose their social license face adverse publicity, hostility 
from various constituent groups within civil society, tougher regulation, and a total ban 
on certain activities. That license can only be retained by building the trust of, and 
establishing credibility not only with government, but more important with a wide range 
of groups within civil society, including environmental NGOs and local communities. 
Indeed, according to ‘green’ industry consultants Ecos:  “The best people to help Cotton 
                                                 
90 Office of Consumer Affairs, 1996 p 6. 
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Australia build their Code were those most opposed to the industry’s farming practices- 
Australia’s leading environmental organizations”. Potentially at least, developing 
partnerships with such groups offers considerable benefits to both sides.91 If partnerships 
can be successfully negotiated with key external stakeholders and would-be critics of the 
industry, this will provide the cotton industry with far greater environmental credibility. 
Necessarily, as a condition of entering such partnerships, the industry would have to take 
demonstrable action to improve their environmental performance. This would include the 
issues of environmental targets, transparency, independent monitoring and third party 
auditing and verification raised above providing a credibility in negotiations which may 
otherwise be lacking. If such a partnership involved some form of formal environmental 
group endorsement, there might also be commercial benefits described below. The 
broader attractions of environmental partnerships have been explored elsewhere, and will 
not be rehearsed here.92   
 
The cotton industry has already advanced some way down this path towards collaboration 
with moderate national environmental groups. In particular, the WWF and Australian 
Conservation Foundation, have entered a dialogue with the cotton industry and  have 
participated in various round tables and other meetings providing input into particular 
processes. For example, WWF has participated on the steering committee in the proposed 
Land and Water BMP module and have acted as sounding boards for proposed cotton 
industry environmental initiatives. From the industry’s point of view, the value is in 
“having parties independent of the industry saying ‘yes’, what they are doing is good”. 
Indeed, it is now the formal policy of Cotton Australia to engage in a “wide consultative 
process with communities [such as] local government, researchers, the conservation 
movement …[and to] facilitate open dialogue on the long term sustainability and 
profitability of the industry”.93 
 
However, formal partnerships have not been successfully negotiated, although this 
situation could possibly change in the future. A draft agreement between environmental 
groups and Cotton Australia was developed in 2001. Under the contemplated agreement, 
key environmental groups were to provide advice to Cotton Australia on developing and 
implementing the industry’s Code of Sustainability. This in turn was intended “to lead to 
positive marketing and branding of Australian cotton internationally”.94 However, the 
agreement was not proceeded with because of concern from members of some of those 
groups about the risks of co-option and compromise. Other environmental groups, 
including the Total Environment Centre declined to participate in negotiations, similarly 
fearing that they would be co-opted by doing so and doubting the industry’s commitment 
to self-regulation or to the environmental outcomes they regarded as bottom lines. 
                                                 
91 We define a partnership as a cooperative agreement between, on the one hand, business, and, on the other 
hand, one or more second parties (government) and/or third parties (eg environmental organisations or 
commercial entities), whereby business voluntarily undertakes to achieve certain environmental 
improvements in exchange for some benefit provided by one or more of the other partnership participants. 
92 See Gunningham, N., & Sinclair, D. (2001) Environmental Partnerships: Combining Sustainability and 
Commercial Advantage in the Agriculture Sector RIRDC, Canberra 
93 Cotton Australia   Policy Position 3rd Edition, January 2003. 
94 Ecos Corporation: Cotton Australia http://www.ecoscorporation.com/clients/cotton.htm accessed 10 Aug 
2003. 
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According to one environmentalist: “even if they do it by the book, even if they adopt 
BMPs, there will still be spray drift and unacceptable contamination of rivers, land and 
water tanks… you’ve got to take the health effects of pesticides seriously. There is no 
reporting database, no data on their impact on workers or the public…and when they 
have pest infestations the economic pressure for hazardous spraying is too much”. 
 
Whether the industry can ever answer its more strident and uncompromising 
environmental critics or whether there is sufficient common ground and ‘win-win’ 
outcomes to develop partnerships remains doubtful. For example one environmentalist 
interviewed stated: “this must be one of the most environmentally unsustainable 
industries on the second driest continent- and for it to try to be sustainable is 
unsustainable. You can’t justify the industry’s environmental impact on the country. If 
they had to internalize their costs, likely there would not be a viable industry. What they 
are doing with BMPs is deckchairs on the titanic”. Some members of local communities 
in cotton growing areas, who believe they have been subjected to high levels of pesticides 
and as a result have suffered serious health damage, take a similar position. 
 
Another point of leverage is market pressure. At first sight this might seem unlikely. 
After all, cotton gives rise to none of the consumer health concerns that have inclined 
large supermarket chains to impose stringent environmental controls on those who supply 
them with food products. It is also conceded by all concerned that there is no opportunity 
for gaining a price premium on the basis of higher environmental performance or a 
certified environmental management system. However, what remains is the opportunity 
to position the Australian cotton industry so that it is (apart from the very small market 
niche occupied by organically grown cotton) the world’s cleanest and best quality 
product. Since the industry exports 90% of its crop this is, potentially, a very important 
consideration. Industry representatives believe it will be possible, by advancing the BMP 
program to the point where it becomes a certified industry-wide EMS, to gain “first cab 
off the rank” status with international purchasers. International clothes retailers and 
others it is believed, prefer to buy Australian cotton (although not at a price premium) 
because of the higher environmental standards involved in its production, thereby 
reducing the risk of their being criticized by NGOs and other industry critics. The key 
here is to establish some form of independent certification (and label) that is recognized 
by the market. Since ISO 14001 seems outside the reach of most growers for reasons 
described above, what might this alternative look like? This is as yet unclear.95   Certainly 
without ‘walking the talk’ it is unlikely the industry would achieve its goal of expanding 
market share, or perhaps even of market maintenance. 
 
A further point of leverage concerns commercial third parties. The chemical industry, 
which of course supplies the cotton farmers with their principal input, already provides a 
rebate to farmers who have an audited BMP. This reportedly produced a substantial jump 
in the numbers going through the audit process but has since been discontinued. 
 
                                                 
95 Although WWF is currently using Australian cotton BMPs as a benchmark when comparing practices in 
parts of Asia 
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Finally, the best solution is to design complementary combinations using a number of 
different instruments. As a result, self-regulation, government regulation, and third party 
oversight may be capable of being combined in complementary combinations that work 
better than any one or even two of these instruments acting together. For example, in the 
case of the chemical industry's Responsible Care program, even though the industry as a 
whole has a self interest in improving its health and environmental performance, 
collective action problems and the temptation to free ride mean that self-regulation and 
its related codes of practice alone, have not been insufficient to achieve that goal. 
However, a tripartite approach, involving co-regulation and a range of third party 
oversight mechanisms, may well be a viable option. This might involve the creation of: 
• Greater transparency through a community right-to-know about chemical emissions 
program, which in turn enables the community to act as a more effective 
countervailing force;  
• Greater accountability through the introduction of independent third party audits 
which identify whether code participants are living up to their commitments under the 
code, and which involve methodologies for checking and verifying that 
responsibilities are being met; and 
• Government regulation which, in the case of companies which are part of the scheme, 
need only "kick in" to the extent that the code itself is failing or when individual 
companies seek to defect from their obligations under it and free ride.96 
 
                                                 
96 Gunningham, N., (1995) Environment, Self regulation and the Chemical Industry: Assessing responsible 
Care Law and Policy Number 17. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
What role should industry self-regulation play in improving the health and environmental 
performance of the cotton industry? Will this role be effective not only in achieving this 
goal but also in protecting the industry’s ‘licence to operate’? Achieving effective 
industry self-regulation is never easy, as the large number of failed self-regulatory 
initiatives bears witness.97 Yet in the case of the cotton industry there are considerable 
arguments in its favour: not as a stand-alone mechanism, but in combination with a 
regulatory underpinning and third -party oversight.  
 
The industry has a number of characteristics that lend themselves to this approach, not 
least being a well funded and sophisticated industry association, a relatively young and 
adaptable workforce, and an economic self-interest in finding ways to reduce inputs, 
including pesticides. Beyond all else, the industry has a compelling self-interest in 
responding effectively to a perceived environmental crisis and to external stakeholder 
pressure, in order to protect its social license and avoid economically damaging 
restrictions on its activities. Its response has been to develop a BMP program that is 
practical and accessible to growers, that provides ‘ownership’, and that seeks to nurture a 
‘custodianship ethic’. 
 
It has already achieved considerable progress. Testing by results, pesticide residues are 
down, as are other indicators such as the number of fish kills and external complaints. 
Some environmental groups at least, no longer regard the industry as an environmental 
pariah, and it is some considerable time since it has received adverse publicity in the 
media. A substantial and increasing number of growers are participating in the BMP audit 
program (50% of the industry by volume, 30% of all growers). Further initiatives to add 
new modules and to expand the BMP program into an industry-wide EMS, are in 
progress. 
 
And yet despite all this, the program still has important limitations. A substantial 
minority of growers still does not participate and there seems no credible way in which 
the industry association alone can persuade this group to improve its health and 
environmental performance. While shaming and peer pressure can have some impact, 
only government regulation has the capacity to directly influence the behaviour of this 
group on any scale. Co-regulation rather than self-regulation seems the only credible 
option, with government regulation (including credible enforcement) underpinning the 
industry’s self-regulatory approach. Yet the current approach of government regulators 
has been characterized as “regulation by wet lettuce” with very few resources being 
                                                 
97 While little research has been conducted on the effectiveness of BMPs, a recent Productivity 
Commission report (Industries, Land Use and Water Quality in the Great Barrier Reef Catchment, 
Productivity Commission, 2003) suggests that BMPs aimed to reduce nutrient and chemical losses to the 
environment within and across catchments found a vary variable response. For example a survey of cane 
growers since 1998 found that about 90 per cent conducted soil testing, but that alternating the use of 
different crops across seasons had a lower adoption rate, that there was variability in the uptake of various 
‘desirable’ practices in horticultural industries and that ‘scope for improving the adoption (and ongoing 
development) of BMPs ...clearly remains” (p 207). 
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committed to the industry, an almost entirely reactive approach, and no credible 
enforcement policy. 
 
Even in relation to participants in the BMP program, there is much that remains to be 
done in terms of protecting the industry’s social licence and convincing critics that it is 
really ‘walking the talk’. A particular concern voiced by some (not unsympathetic) 
environmental groups and others, is that now that the immediate crisis has receded, the 
BMP program is “running out of legs” and that progress is slowing considerably. 
Independent and credible environmental targets, monitoring, reporting and external 
auditing, increased transparency and a greater participatory role for third parties are 
amongst the most compelling issues that the industry needs to address in order to move 
onto the next stage of its self-regulatory initiative. It also needs to engage more directly 
with a range of third parties. Collaboration with moderate environmental groups is 
already bringing greater trust and credibility, but others, and local community groups, 
remain highly sceptical. Greater transparency, direct involvement of outsiders in 
decision-making and  external verification are priorities. There are also opportunities to 
harness other commercial third parties, such as insurance companies or suppliers of 
chemicals as surrogate regulators. 
 
Whether however, even these approaches will be sufficient to satisfy its more strident 
critics seems very doubtful. Parts of the environmental movement remain convinced that 
the industry is unsustainable in its land use, water use and chemical practices and that the 
current BMP initiatives amount to ‘little more than rearranging the deckchairs on the 
Titanic”. Certainly, the BMP program to date only relates to a limited number of issues 
and ‘moderate’ environmental groups, also point out that the cotton industry is still “a 
long long way from any concept of sustainable agriculture or a workable model of how 
on-farm practice should link to catchment resources and targets”. 
 
But for those who do believe that the industry can be made sustainable, the question is 
how best to achieve it? Co-regulation, notwithstanding its flaws, may yet prove to be a 
more viable vehicle through which to pursue this goal than any of the alternatives. In the 
context of the cotton industry, where government resources are very limited, problems 
are complex and do not readily lend themselves to a conventional regulatory solutions, 
and the industry itself has the capacity and the self-interest to take at least a substantial 
part of the regulatory burden, there are compelling reasons to embrace it. Even in these 
circumstances, the industry association faces considerable challenges: if it goes too 
slowly, it will gain little credibility or external recognition for its efforts yet if it goes to 
fast, it may generate such a level of resistance from its members that too many withdraw. 
And if government is unwilling to play its part by providing credible enforcement against 
recalcitrants, then much of the work of the industry association towards workers health 
and environmental protection may be undone. How the next phase of the cotton 
industry’s journey towards sustainability, plays out, or whether this is a ‘goal too far’ 
remains to be seen. 
 
